CARBON
REDUCTION POLICY:
CAP n
TRADE?, or CARBON DISCHARGE FEES?
by Peter Bearse
Why
have the media, the Obama Administration and most commentators on energy
policy, global warming and climate change lined up behind a policy of
CapnTrade as the main mechanism to reduce discharges of carbon into the
atmosphere? Why called do they treat the choice as a slam dunk for Cap n
Trade?, practically ignoring the alternative? Why?
Most
economists favor the use of carbon discharge fees. One major reason politicians have avoided this alternative
approach is that it has been mislabeled -- as a carbon tax. Pinning a tax
label on anything is like the kiss of death. True political leaders would
confront the untruth of a bad label and try to inform the public as to the true
nature of the choice at hand. For a carbon tax is not a tax at all. It is a
fee, an effluent fee --a continuous penalty for on-going air pollution. In the
case of carbon, it is a charge per pound of carbon discharged into the
atmosphere. The greater the number of pounds discharged, the greater the cost
to the polluter; the lesser the number of pounds, the lesser the cost. So, a
carbon discharge fee can serve as a strong incentive for a company to reduce
harmful discharges.
Notice
that pollution is a classic externality of a market economy a cost to
others that the source doesnt pay for so that, unless there is some offsetting
cost, there is no incentive to reduce the pollution. Thus, a carbon discharge
fee is a market-perfecting device. It provides incentives in the right
direction. People are induced to behave in a better way.
By
contrast, Cap nTrade is a system that relies far too much on bureaucratic
decision-making and allows far too much horse-trading between politicians and
large companies, and among companies, too. Regulators establish a cap on the
total tonnage of carbon that polluters can discharge in an area, then establish
a market for trading discharge permits. Theres too much scope for abuse and
corruption. Members of Congress, already corrupted by big money, would be
subject to strong pressures to favor firms or industries in or out of their
districts.
Three
other major factors figure into decision-making and legislating on this issue:
1. The EPA: An alternative to both the CapnTrade and Discharge Fee
approaches is for the EPA to follow through on its threat to regulate carbon
emissions as dangerous under terms of the Clean Air Act of 1970. EPAs ability
to do this at the agencys discretion has survived court challenges all the way
up to the Supreme Court (decision of 2007). Those who think the European Union
alternative is OK may not be fazed by the EPA!
2. Our European allies: The EU is lobbying
the USA to join them in adopting a CapnTrade system. Why? -- Because creating a much larger (EU-USA combined) market
for discharge permits would lower the high administrative costs of their
bureaucratic system. EU allies pressure may explain why the Obama administration
is pushing CapnTrade, but that doesnt make it an American system.
3. Who gains financially from the
program?: Here is where the differences
are least. The process of answering this question would be difficult,
contentious and controversial under either alternative. Why? -- Because
tremendous new revenues to government would be generated either way. Under
CapnTrade, a government agency would auction or otherwise sell permits to emit
a certain number of tons of carbon per year. The immediate gross revenue yield
to the government is estimated to start at $20-30 billion per year and rise
steadily year-after-year as the carbon cap is decreased and the prices of
permits rise. Under a Discharge Fee arrangement, polluters would pay a price
per ton of carbon actually discharged over a period of time. The price of
carbon, the core of any climate plan, could be similar either way. [i]
How
would the new revenues be used? Would they be dedicated to green programs,
used to fund other government programs, or returned to poor people via an
income redistribution scheme? These questions require political answers.
Wouldnt it be nice if the politics of carbon reduction were limited to the one
area where differences are least? Impossible. Thus, a key consideration in
the choice of alternatives is: Which option minimizes reliance upon political
incentives?
The
CapnTrade alternative fails to take into account that politicians incentives
work in the wrong direction. One should
avoid setting up any system that leaves too many levers that politicians can
try to manipulate for the benefit of their reelection. CapnTrade makes several such levers
available, including:
(1) Initial allocation of
free permits to major polluters like power companies;
(2) Estimation of the amount of carbon emitted by companies;
(3) The setting of fuel
taxes (still necessary, even under CapnTrade); and
(4) Regulatory
determinations, including allowable offsets, system oversight and
accountability.
Surprise,
surprise! The Congress, anxious to push through President Osamas climate
bill -- the American Clean Energy and Security Act [a.k.a. the Waxman-Markey
bill] -- has pulled every lever that CapnTrade makes available. Once again, we
see that there is no limit to Congressional corrupt-ability -- the tendency of Congress to ensure
reelection of its Members by pandering to big money contributors and special
interests.
Perhaps
the most fundamental problem is the bills complexity. Its 932 pages challenge
both accountability and transparency,
not only of the Act but of Congress itself, an institution already
averse and practically immune to transparency and accountability. Other levers
pulled by the bill compromise the main purpose of the Act and deny it
integrity. These include:
L Only 15% of the permits would be
auctioned; 85% would be given away, primarily to power companies. Alan Viard,
analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, likens giving permits to polluters
to handing the proceeds of a tobacco tax to the shareholders of Philip
Morris.[ii]
L According to the May 23rd - 29th Economist, the bill includes a
dizzying array of handouts
.(including) a huge increase in offsets
.open to
abuse.
What is
not to like about the Discharge Fee option? -- very little. It does far more to
avoid the bureaucratic command and control nature of most environmental
regulation. They are more easily adaptable to deal with other greenhouse gases,
like methane. They offer simplicity compared to complex CapnTrade
arrangements. In order to work well, the latter require permit auctions, a
command and control regulatory system, and oversight of offsets. The latter
are carbon reducing projects, like planting trees in the Amazon, that may have
nothing to do with the carbon output of the offset buyer.
Its
not that CapnTrade cannot be made to work.
The EPA has successfully applied the system to sulphuric acid (acid
rain) emissions. The New England states are having some success with RGGI --
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative.[iii] The issues are comparative
ease-of-use, cost-effectiveness and in-corruptibility. The Waxman-Markey bill
doesnt pass these tests.[iv] The public deserves to be better informed about
the alternatives. We need full debate rather than one option, badly crafted by
a corrupt Congress, crammed down our throats as part of the Presidents
initiative on climate change.
PETER BEARSE, Ph.D.,
International Consulting Economist, 5/23/09
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[i] Quote from Drum, Kevin (2009), Up Trading:
How Obama can fix the climate, raise billions for clean tech, and send you a
fat check, MOTHER JONES (March/April, p. 53).
[ii] America and climate change: Cap and trade,
with handouts and loopholes: The first climate-change with a chance of passing
is weaker and worse than expected, The Economist, May 23rd-29th, 2009.
[iii] Carbon Market Matures: New Englands
Financial, energy acumen boosts cap and trade system, MASS HIGH TECH (April
24-30, 2009), p. 21.
[iv] Telford, Eric (2009), Tell Congress to
Vote NO to Cap-and-Trade, Americans for Prosperity / Right Online (May 15).